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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-THE CLEAN WATER ACT-CONGRESS
HAS ENTRUSTED THE EPA, NOT THE COURTS, WITH THE FINAL
WORD ON FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION REGULATORY LAW. Arkansas
v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
I. FACTS
The City of Fayetteville, Arkansas,' is situated in the Boston
Mountains in the northwest corner of the state, approximately twenty-
five miles east of the Oklahoma border. Fayetteville straddles a
mountaintop2 in such a way that about half of its population lives in an
area which is drained westward by the Illinois River, while the other
half lives in an area which drains eastward into the White River basin.'
Sometime in the early 1980s it became apparent that the waste-
water treatment facility upon which Fayetteville had relied for over
twenty years to dispose of its sewage and other commercial and indus-
trial wastes would have to be replaced." This facility discharged all of
its waste into the White River, 5 resulting in the river's failure to assim-
ilate' the waste without violating Arkansas water quality standards 7 for
that body of water.8 The river's inability to absorb the waste caused a
number of fish kills.9 Approximately ten miles from Fayetteville, the
White River flows into Beaver Reservoir, which is the main source of
1. Fayetteville has a population of 42,099 according to the 1990 Census.
2. Telephone Interview with Pat Rankin, Attorney, Environmental Protection Agency, Re-
gion VI (June 18, 1992).
3. Brief for Petitioners at 4-5, Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) (No. 90-
1262).
4. Brief for Petitioners at 4.
5. Brief for the Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] at 6, Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) (No. 90-1266).
6. "Assimilate" means to "take in and appropriate as nourishment: absorb into the system."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 132 (1986).
In terms of a waterway, "'[a]ssimilation' refers to the natural mechanisms [by which a
stream] remove[s] nutrients such as phosphorous and nitrogen from the water, and includes
processes such as sedimentation and incorporation into living organisms." Brief for Petitioners at 5
n.7.
7. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. Water quality standards are written in narra-
tive form and are based on the historical use of a particular waterway. They represent an ideal
standard of water quality for the particular body of water in question. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(2)(A)
(1988).
8. Brief for the EPA at 6.
9. Brief for Petitioners at 4.
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drinking water for most of northwest Arkansas. 10 As a result, the Ar-
kansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology (ADPC&E) or-
dered the City to build a new wastewater treatment facility.11
Subsequently, the City of Fayetteville applied for and received
federal financial assistance from the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) for the construction of a new wastewater treatment plant. 2
Prior to actual construction, the City of Fayetteville held some forty
public hearings and conducted numerous feasibility studies before
choosing a split flow discharge 3 that was designed to avoid any further
violations of Arkansas water quality standards for the White River."
Under the plan, half of Fayetteville's treated wastes were to be dis-
charged into the White River and half into an unnamed stream which
is a tributary of the Illinois River. 5 The unnamed stream flows for two
miles where it joins Mud Creek, then another three miles where it flows
into Clear Creek, and thirteen more miles before its confluence with
the Illinois River some twenty-two miles from the Oklahoma border.",
The portion of the Illinois River in Oklahoma stretching west from the
Arkansas state line to Lake Tenkiller is designated by Oklahoma stat-
ute as a "scenic river."' 7
Fayetteville chose the split flow design because it diminished po--
tential damage to the environment 8 by lessening the amount of efflu-
ent' 9 discharged into the White River.20 The design also had the effect
10. Id. The Beaver Water District was one of the original parties to this action and a peti-
tioner before the Supreme Court in Petition No. 90-1262.
11. Maria V. Maurrasse, Comment, Oklahoma v. EPA: Does the Clean Water Act Provide
an Effective Remedy to Downstream States or Is There Still Room Left for Federal Common
Law? 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1137, 1139 n.18 (1991).
12. Brief for the EPA at 6-7.
13. Brief for Petitioners at 4. The City of Fayetteville considered several methods of waste-
water treatment before choosing the split flow design. Among the proposals was a plan designed to
discharge 100% of the City's effluent into the White River. This plan was opposed by both the
Beaver Water District and the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology
(ADPC&E) because of continued violations of Arkansas water quality standards for the White
River. Other options included a design to pipe the wastewater south to the Arkansas River and a
land treatment method plan. Both the ADPC&E and the EPA favored the split flow design. Tele-
phone Interview with James M. McCord, Attorney, City of Fayetteville (June 24, 1992).
14. Brief for the EPA at 7.
15. Id.
16. Brief for Petitioners at 4-5.
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1452(b)(1) (1990).
18. Brief for Petitioners at 5 n.4.
19. "Effluent" is defined as "something that flows out: as... liquid discharged as waste (as
water used in an industrial process or sewage)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 725 (1986).
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of returning the wastewater generated by each half of the City to its
respective river basin."
Pursuant to federal water pollution regulatory requirements set
forth in Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 22 the City of Fayetteville,
in 1985, applied to the EPA2 1 for a National Pollutant Discharge Elim-
ination System (NPDES) permit to operate its new treatment plant. 24
The EPA published a draft NPDES permit in July 1985, held an infor-
mal public hearing in August,26 and issued a final permit to the City of
Fayetteville in November that was to become effective in December
1985.26
The EPA found that the split flow discharge would result in com-
pliance with Arkansas water quality standards for both the White and
Illinois Rivers.2 ' The EPA also ruled that the discharge into the Illinois
River would have no adverse effect on Oklahoma water quality stan-
dards.26 The permit was issued with strict limitations29 and was made
subject to a "reopener provision." 30 This "provision" was a condition
20. Brief for the EPA at 7.
21. Brief for Petitioners at 5 n.4. The plan to discharge effluent into the Illinois River was
not a novel approach to wastewater disposal in the northwest Arkansas area. Other municipalities
in the region have historically discharged their effluents into Illinois River tributaries. Brief for the
EPA at 6 n.8.
22. Section 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)). Section 402(a) of the Clean Water Act
allows the Administrator of the EPA to issue a permit for the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters of the United States, subject to other requirements under the Act. 33 U S.C. §
1342(a) (1988).
23. The EPA was the permitting authority because, at the time, Arkansas had no EPA-
approved NPDES permitting authority of its own. Brief for Petitioners at 5 n.5. Section 402(b) of
the Clean Water Act allows a state to establish its own NPDES permitting program subject to
EPA approval. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). Arkansas' NPDES permitting program was approved by the
EPA in November 1986. To date, 39 states have been delegated NPDES permitting authority by
the EPA. Telephone Interview with Ann Bobo, Attorney, Arkansas Department of Pollution Con-
trol and Ecology (June 18, 1992).
24. Brief for the EPA at 7.
25. Brief for Petitioners at 5.
26. Brief for the EPA at 7.
27. Brief for Petitioners at 5.
28. Id. The Oklahoma standards contain "numeric dissolved oxygen requirements, limita-
tions on the concentrations of nutrients (phosphorous and nitrogen/phosphorous concentration ra-
tio), and numeric limitations on inorganic elements and organic chemicals." Brief for the EPA at
8.
29. The permit contained stringent limitations on "oxygen demand, total suspended solids,
and phosphorous." Brief for the EPA at 7.
30. Id.
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based on the outcome of an ongoing study of the river.3 ' The study was
designed to determine whether more stringent effluent limitations
would be needed to ensure that the Fayetteville discharge would not
result in any violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards for the
Illinois River.32
In response to the EPA's issuance of the Fayetteville permit, the
State of Oklahoma, in December 1985, requested an evidentiary hear-
ing.3 3 Oklahoma alleged that the Fayetteville discharge violated its
water quality standards for the Illinois River. 4 Oklahoma's water qual-
ity standards prohibit the degradation of high quality waters, including
those designated as "scenic rivers." 3 Oklahoma's standards also pro-
tect its "scenic rivers" by prohibiting any new point source discharges3
or increased loads from existing ones that will result in degradation of
the water quality.3"
At the three-day evidentiary hearing, 8 the issue before the EPA's
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was whether Fayetteville's discharge
would result in a violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards for
the Illinois River.3 9 Since the Fayetteville facility was not yet opera-
31. EPA, Evaluation and Assessment of Factors Affecting Water Quality of the Illinois
River in Arkansas and Oklahoma (Aug. 1991). This agency report, now in its final draft form,
was initiated in 1985-86 as a result of the litigation which is the subject of this casenote. In its
Executive Summary, pp. xv-xvi, the report concludes that there have been few significant changes
in the water quality of the Illinois River during the period of the study.
32. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1051 (1992).
33. Brief for Petitioners at 6. Section 401(a)(2) of the Clean Water Act provides that if
within 60 days of receiving notification from a source state that a proposed discharge will affect
the quality of waters of a downstream state, the downstream state may object to the issuance of
the permit by notifying the Administrator and the source state in writing of its objections and
requesting a public hearing. The licensing agency is then required to hold such a hearing. 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
34. 112 S. Ct. at 1051.
35. "No degradation shall be allowed in high quality waters which constitute an outstanding
resource or in waters of exceptional recreational or ecological significance. These include water
bodies located in national and State parks, Wildlife Refuges, and those designated 'Scenic Rivers'
.... .STANDARDS FOR OKLAHOMA WATER QUALITY § 3 (1988).
Oklahoma has designated the Illinois River between the Arkansas state line and Lake Tenkil-
ler a "scenic river." OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1452(b)(1) (1990).
36. A "point source" is defined by the Act as "any discernible, confined and discrete con-
veyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit . . . from which
pollutants are , . . discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). "The term 'discharge of a pollutant' . .
means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source . 33
U.S.C. § 1362(12).
37. STANDARDS FOR OKLAHOMA WATER QUALITY § 5 (1988).
38. Brief for Petitioners at 6.
39. Brief for the EPA at 7-8.
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tional, the evidence submitted at the hearing consisted mainly of expert
witness testimony based on theoretical mathematical models.40 Before
predicting what effect the discharge would have on Oklahoma waters,
the experts first had to predict the changes the effluent would undergo
between the point of discharge and the Oklahoma state
line-approximately thirty-nine miles of waterways.4 The ALJ upheld
the issuance of the permit, finding that any impact on Oklahoma water
quality standards would be de minimis at most and that the Fayette-
ville discharge would not have an "undue impact" on Oklahoma's
waters.
4 2
Both parties appealed to the EPA's Chief Judicial Officer (CJO).' 3
Oklahoma objected to the finding that the Fayetteville discharge would
have no effect on its waters. Arkansas challenged the ALJ's ruling that
the Clean Water Act4 4 required it to comply with the water quality
standards of a downstream state. The CJO relied on Section
301(b)(1)(c) of the Act 45 in ruling that an Arkansas discharge must
comply with Oklahoma water quality standards.' However, the CJO
found that a mere theoretical effect on those standards would not be
enough to prevent the issuance of the permit. Some measurable effect
on water quality standards was required before the permit would be
withheld. 7 The CJO found that the ALJ had applied the wrong stan-
dard in his decision.' 8 Rather than an "undue impact" standard, the
CJO announced that the proper standard was whether the record
showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the discharge would
not cause an "actual detectable" effect on Oklahoma waters. 9 He then
remanded the case to the ALJ for a determination under the proper
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id.
42. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1051 (1992).
43. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 597 (10th Cir. 1990).
44. The Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988) [hereinafter the Act].
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(I)(C). This section sets forth a timetable for standards and en-
forcement of effluent limitations. It states, in pertinent part, that there shall be achieved: "(C) not
later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water
quality standards . . . established pursuant to any State law or regulations . . . or any other
Federal law or regulation, or required to implement any applicable water quality standard estab-
lished pursuant to this chapter." Id. 112 S. Ct. at 1052 n.3.
46. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1051-52 (1992) (citing Brief for Petitioners
app. at 116a-17a).
47. 112 S. Ct. at 1051-52 (citing Brief for Petitioners app. at l16a-17a).
48. Brief for the EPA at 9.
49. 112 S. Ct. at 1052 (citing Brief for Petitioners app. at 117a).
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standard. On remand, the ALJ reviewed the record and again upheld
the issuance of the permit by finding that the Fayetteville discharge
would have no "actual detectable" impact on Oklahoma's water quality
standards."0
Following another appeal by Oklahoma, the CJO again affirmed
the ALJ's finding. 1 This final administrative decision came in Decem-
ber 1988, three years and one month after the EPA's original issuance
of Fayetteville's NPDES permit in November of 1985. The City of
Fayetteville proceeded with construction and eventually invested $40
million in its new state-of-the-art wastewater treatment facility, em-
ploying the newest technologies available.5" The plant became opera-
tional pursuant to its NPDES permit in January 1989.11
On appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit,54 both parties objected to the EPA's rulings on the same
grounds each had advanced in the administrative proceedings below.
Arkansas objected to the EPA's position that it was required by the
Act to comply with the applicable water quality standards of a down-
stream state. Oklahoma argued that the Fayetteville discharge would
violate its water quality standards for the Illinois River. 5
In a decision dated July 11, 1990,56 the Tenth Circuit concurred
with the EPA that the Act required Arkansas to comply with
Oklahoma's federally approved water quality standards. 57 The Tenth
Circuit, however, reversed the EPA's issuance of Fayetteville's per-
50. Id. at 1052. The ALJ based his decision on numerical criteria for specific standards,
theoretical models, and expert witness testimony. Telephone Interview with Pat Rankin, Attorney,
EPA, Region VI (Sept. 24, 1992).
51. Brief for the EPA at 10. See also Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 597 (10th Cir.
1990).
52. Brief for Petitioners at 4 n.3. Telephone Interview with Pat Rankin, Attorney, EPA,
Region VI (June 18, 1992). The new technologies included "a combination of biological phosphor-
ous removal and nitrification, rapid sand filtration, post-aeration, dechlorination, and effluent stor-
age . . . ." Brief for Petitioners at 4 n.3. During the evidentiary hearing, the Oklahoma Depart-
ment of Health acknowledged that the treatment methods incorporated by the Fayetteville plant
were "the most thorough and complete" technologies available. Id.
53. Brief for the EPA at 11.
54. 112 S. Ct. at 1052 n.4. The Arkansas petition was filed in the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals where it was transferred to the Tenth Circuit and consolidated with Oklahoma's petition.
Id.
55. Id. at 1052.
56. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 595 (10th Cir. 1990).
57. 112 S. Ct. at 1052. Relying on Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1984), the Tenth Circuit ruled that this conclusion by the
EPA was a reasonable exercise of the administrative agency's authority and was, therefore, enti-
tled to substantial deference. 908 F.2d at 630.
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mit.58 The court ruled that the EPA had misinterpreted Oklahoma's
water quality standards.59 The EPA's interpretation of these standards
was never at issue in the administrative proceedings below. 0 The Tenth
Circuit held that "where water quality standards violations are already
occurring in the receiving waters, no additional point source discharge
to those waters may be permitted if it would contribute to the condi-
tions that produced the violations.""' The court of appeals found that
the Illinois River was already in violation of its water quality stan-
dards,62 and that there was evidence in the record to support the con-
clusion that the Fayetteville effluent would reach the Oklahoma
border.6"
Based on these findings, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the EPA's
issuance of the permit was "arbitrary and capricious""' for misinter-
preting Sections three and five of Oklahoma's water quality standards65
and reversed the issuance of Fayetteville's permit.66 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari," reversed the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion, and reinstated the EPA's issuance of the Fayetteville NPDES per-
mit.68 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Throughout the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court relied
on the federal common law of public nuisance" to settle disputes be-
58. 112 S. Ct. at 1052.
59. Brief for Petitioners at 8.
60. State water quality standards are subject to approval by the Administrator of the EPA,
giving them a "federal character." 112 S. Ct. at 1059. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
61. 908 F.2d at 634.
62. 112 S. Ct. at 1052.
63. 908 F.2d at 629.
64. Id at 616. "[A]n [administrative] agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if the
agency 'entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem [or] offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency.'" Id. (citing Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
65. These provisions are reprinted in the appendix to the Tenth Circuit's opinion. See
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 635.
66. 908 F.2d at 616.
67. 111 S. Ct. 1412 (1991). Arkansas' Petition No. 90-1262 was joined with Petition No.
90-1266, EPA v. Oklahoma, on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
68. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1060-61 (1992).
69. A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public, such as an interference with the public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
The Supreme Court in Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), held that there was no general
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tween states over the protection of interstate resources and to guard the
sovereign rights of one state from encroachment by another.7 Included
among this line of cases are instances in which one state discharged
into an interstate waterway a pollutant which interfered with the enjoy-
ment of the shared resource by a downstream state. 1 In many of these
early cases, the Supreme Court invoked its original jurisdiction to re-
solve interstate disputes involving resources common to both states.
7 2
This line of reasoning culminated in 1972 with the Supreme Court
decision of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I).71 In Milwau-
kee I the Court stated that "'through these successive disputes and
decisions this Court is practically building up what may not improperly
federal common law. However, in a case handed down the same day, Hinderlider v. La Plata Co.,
304 U.S. 92 (1938), the Court decided that any interstate dispute involving a shared stream was
still a federal question.
70. Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution,
134 U. PA. L. REv. 121, 152 (1985).
71. For instance in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), Missouri sought to enjoin
Illinois from discharging sewage into an interstate river. The Court held that although Missouri
failed to prove its damages, there existed a need for federal jurisdiction in interstate pollution
disputes. Similarly, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), an interstate air
pollution dispute, Justice Holmes wrote for the Court:
When the states by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances
impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done.
They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of
their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in
this court.
Id. at 237 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901)).
Employing similar reasoning in New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931), the
Court enjoined New York City from dumping garbage into the ocean which was later washing up
on the New Jersey coast. In awarding the injunction, the Court relied on the common law of
neither state, implying the existence of a federal common law. See also New York v. New Jersey,
256 U.S. 296 (1921).
72. See Glicksman, supra note 70, at 154. In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S.
493 (1971), the Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, saying that it was ill-equipped
to act as fact-finder in a trial involving such complex facts and suggested that state nuisance
common law should be applied in cases of interstate water disputes. Id. at 499 n.3.
A 1971 Tenth Circuit decision reached an opposite conclusion. Finding that no comprehen-
sive federal statute covered the interstate water pollution question at issue in the case, the Tenth
Circuit in Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971), held that "[flederal common law ...
[is the] basis for dealing in uniform standard with the environmental rights of a State against
improper impairment by sources outside its domain." 441 F.2d at 241.
Agreeing with the Tenth Circuit in Pankey, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in Ohio
v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp. the following year in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91
(1972).
73. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The State of Illinois sued to enjoin the Sewerage Commission of
the City of Milwaukee from discharging daily "some 200 million gallons of raw or inadequately
treated sewage and other waste materials" into Lake Michigan. Id. at 93.
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be called interstate common law.' -7 The Court held that the federal
common law of public nuisance applied in cases of interstate water pol-
lution disputes, but prophetically cautioned that a time might come
when federal legislation would preempt the field.
75
Congress enacted the first Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA) in 1948.6 The FWPCA so limited the power of the federal
government 77 and was so ineffective that no suits were ever filed under
it.78 The Act Was amended five times between 1948 and 1972. 79
Only six months after the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Mil-
waukee I, Congress overhauled the entire FWPCA framework because
the program had been "inadequate in every vital aspect."80 Congress
again amended the Act in 1977 and renamed it the Clean Water Act.81
The Act states that its objective is "to restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." '82 It es-
tablishes as its goals the elimination of pollutants into navigable wa-
ters8" and the attainment of water quality.84 Toward that end, the
Clean Water Act also makes illegal the discharge of pollutants into any
navigable waters except as allowed under other applicable sections of
the Act.85
To achieve these goals, the Act sets up three types of mecha-
nisms:86 (1) effluent limitations, 87 (2) water quality standards,88 and
74. Id. at 105-06 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907)).
75. Id. at 107.
76. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) [here-
inafter FWPCA].
77. Maurrasse, supra note 11, at 1146-47.
78. Steven J. Bushong, Comment, Upstream Pollution and Downstream Problems:
Oklahoma v. EPA Makes a Splash in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.
233, 237 (1992).
79. Id. See Genie B. Whitesell, Note, International Paper and Interstate Water Pollution:
A Two-Ton Problem in a One-Ton Regulatory Garbage Bag, 4 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 377 nn.l-2
(1988-89). See also Steven Gaynor, Comment, The Dilemma of the Downstream Plaintiff in an
Interstate Water Pollution Case, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 257, 262-64 (1988-89).
80. Bushong, supra note 78, at 238 (citing S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674). See also Calvin R. Dexter & Teresa J.
Schwarzenbart, Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal Common Law of
Water Pollution, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 627, 641 (1982). See generally Charles W. Smith, Highlights
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 77 DICK. L. REV. 459 (1973).
81. Bushong, supra note 78, at 238.
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
83. Id. § 1251(a)(1) (1988).
84. Id. § 1251(a)(2) (1988).
85. Id. § 1311(a) (1988). See also id. §§ 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, 1344 (1988).
86. Maurrasse, supra note 11, at 1149.
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(3) the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). 9
The NPDES provision establishes a federal-state partnership for per-
mitting point source discharges.90 Under the NPDES, there are two
permitting systems: (1) a federal program administered by the EPA,9
and (2) state programs that are authorized and approved by the EPA
and which must satisfy federal requirements.92 In the regulatory
scheme of state-operated programs, much emphasis is placed on these
federal oversight provisions.
If the discharge allowed by a NPDES permit in one state will vio-
late the water quality standards of a receiving state, the source state
must notify the affected state and provide an opportunity for a public
hearing.9" The affected state has an opportunity before the permit is
issued to make recommendations to the upstream source state, which
must consider the recommendations. If the source state refuses to ac-
cept the recommendations of the affected state, it must notify the af-
fected state and the EPA of its reasons for choosing not to incorporate
the recommendations. " The downstream affected state cannot block
the issuance of the permit by the upstream state, but the EPA retains
87. "Effluent limitations" are technology-based limitations promulgated by the EPA. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311 (b), 1314(b) (1988). "Effluent limitation" is defined as "any restriction established
by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical,
biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters..
Id. § 1362(11) (1988).
88. "Water quality standards" are, in general, promulgated by the states, subject to ap-
proval by the Administrator of the EPA, and based on consideration of the use of the particular
waterway. They represent an ideal or goal for the water quality of the body of water for which
they are devised. Section 1313(c)(2)(A) provides in full:
Whenever the State revises or adopts a new standard, such revised or new standard
shall be submitted to the Administrator. Such revised or new water quality standard
shall consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water qual-
ity criteria for such waters based upon such uses. Such standards shall be such as to
protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the pur-
poses of this chapter. Such standards shall be established taking into consideration their
use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational
purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other purposes, and also taking into consider-
ation their use and value for navigation.
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1988).
89. Id. § 1342 (1988). The purpose of the NPDES permit system is to enforce effluent
limitations and water quality standards.
90. Whitesell, supra note 79, at 378.
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1988).
92. Id. § 1342(b) (1988). The EPA was the permitting authority in this case because, at
that time, Arkansas had no federally approved authority of its own.
93. Id. § 1342(b)(3) (1988).
94. Id. § 1342(b)(5) (1988).
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the authority to veto the permit. 95
Section 401(a)(2) of the Act provides that when a discharge may
affect the water quality of another state, the permitting authority
"shall condition such license or permit in such manner as may be nec-
essary to insure compliance with applicable water quality require-
ments." 96 Section 510 of the Act, the "State Authority" provision,
reserves for the states the right to adopt any measure of pollution con-
trol or abatement provided it is not less stringent than federal require-
ments.9" Section 510 of the Act further states that "nothing in this
chapter shall . . be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting
any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (in-
cluding boundary waters) of such States."""
Subsequent to the passage of the 1972 and 1977 Amendments to
the FWPCA (the Clean Water Act), the Supreme Court in The City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II)" again addressed the same
underlying facts it had faced in Milwaukee I. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, fulfilled the Court's prediction in Milwaukee I
and held that Congress had "occupied the field through the establish-
ment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert
[federal] agency." 10' 1 Because of the comprehensive nature of the Act,
according to Rehnquist, there was no longer an interstice in the federal
statutory framework to be filled by the federal common law. 0 2 The
Court reasoned that the NPDES system of issuing permits provided
ample opportunity for an affected state to participate in a source state's
permitting decision by virtue of the notice and opportunity for public
hearing required by Section 402(b)(3) of the Act.103 While the Court's
95. Id. § 1342(d)(2) (1988).
96. Id. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
97. Id. § 1370 (1988).
98. Id. Oklahoma promulgated its anti-degradation standard for scenic rivers under the
authority of this provision. Arkansas argued that, under the language of Section 510 of the Act,
these more stringent standards could not be applied to out-of-state dischargers.
99. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
100. See supra note 73.
101. 451 U.S. at 317.
102. Id. at 323.
103. Id. at 325-26.
The statutory scheme established by Congress provides a forum for the pursuit of
such claims before expert agencies by means of the permit-granting process. It would
be quite inconsistent with this scheme if federal courts were in effect to 'write their own
ticket' under the guise of federal common law after permits have already been issued




decision in Milwaukee II made it plain that there was no longer a fed-
eral common law remedy available in interstate pollution cases, it left
open the question of the availability of a state common law remedy.
The State of Illinois thus brought another action, this time under
its own statutory and common law. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
(Milwaukee 111)10 " the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held Illinois
(an affected state) could not apply its own state law to an out-of-state
discharger. The court interpreted Section 510 of the Act10 5 as referring
to the right of a state to regulate discharges within the state and "not
to any right of a state to impose more stringent limitations upon dis-
charges in another state."106 The Seventh Circuit reasoned' that al-
lowing an affected state to apply its more stringent standards on up-
stream states would create regulatory chaos by potentially subjecting
source states to the laws of a number of downstream states. This policy,
the court said, would erode the uniformity envisioned by the Act. 1
0
In 1987 the Supreme Court ruled on the state law issue in Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Ouellette.'08 In Ouellette, Vermont landowners
along Lake Champlain brought a suit against International Paper
Company for discharging pollutants into the lake from its location in
the State of New York. 0 9 The Supreme Court agreed with the tenets
of the Seventh Circuit decision in Milwaukee III and reversed the deci-
sions of the Vermont District Court" and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals"' in favor of the Vermont residents. The Court held that in
cases of interstate water pollution which are governed by the Clean
Water Act, "the court must apply the law of the State in which the
point source is located.""' 2 In this case, the law of New York would
control. The Court reasoned that affected states occupy a subordinate
position to source states in the federal regulatory scheme since affected
states, under the NPDES permitting system,"13 are notified and given
104. 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
106. 731 F.2d at 413.
107. Id. at 414. The court did not rule that Section 510 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370
(1988), would prohibit an out-of-state plaintiff from invoking the laws of a source state against a
polluter located within the source state.
108. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
109. Id. at 483-84.
110. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt. 1985), aff'd in part.
rev'd in part, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
111. 776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
112. 479 U.S. at 487.
113. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. The NPDES permitting system is set
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an opportunity to participate in a source state's public hearing on the
issuance of the permit."" Further, affected states cannot block the issu-
ance of the permit, but can only appeal to the Administrator of the
EPA." 5 The Court also agreed with the policy reasons of Milwaukee
III, emphasizing that Vermont's position would allow states to do "in-
directly what they could not do directly-regulate the conduct of out-
of-state sources."' 6
Federal oversight of the regulatory issues involved in interstate
water disputes since the passage of the Clean Water Act was the focus
of a 1988 Fourth Circuit case, Champion International v. EPA." 7 In
Champion, the EPA intervened on behalf of Tennessee in an interstate
water pollution dispute between the State of Tennessee and a North
Carolina paper mill." 8 When the State of North Carolina declined to
incorporate changes in water quality standards recommended by the
EPA in its NPDES permit to Champion, the EPA assumed permitting
authority." 9 The EPA did so under the authority granted it by Section
402 of the Clean Water Act of 1977120 which allows the "EPA to take
jurisdiction and issue a permit in the event of an impasse between a
State and the EPA Administrator."'' Although the Fourth Circuit va-
cated the judgment of the district court' 22 and remanded for want of
out in Section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). That section sets up two systems. One
system is administered by the EPA, wherein a permit to discharge pollutants into waterways is
issued by the Agency itself. The other system allows states to administer their own programs,
wherein the permit is issued by a state agency which has been authorized and approved by the
EPA, follows federal guidelines, and is subject to the federal oversight provisions set forth by the
Act. In other words, either an NPDES permit is issued by the EPA, or alternatively, it is issued
by a state agency within the source state which has been authorized by the EPA to license such
permits. In this case, the EPA issued Arkansas' permit because Arkansas did not have a federally
approved state agency authorized to do so.
114. 479 U.S. at 490.
115. Id. at 490-91.
116. Id. at 495.
117. 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988).
118. Id. at 183-84. The effluent discharged by the Champion mill into the Pigeon River
violated Tennessee's downstream water quality standards for color. Id.
119. Id. at 184-85.
120. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1988).
121. 850 F.2d at 185. Title 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) allows two grounds for the Administra-
tor to intervene: (1) in the case of an unresolved interstate dispute, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(A),
and (2) when a permit "is outside the requirements of the Clean Water Act," 33 U.S.C. §
1342(d)(2)(A). Id. "If the State does not either resubmit the permit in response to the EPA's
objections or request a public hearing within 90 days, issuing authority passes automatically to the
EPA." Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R 123.44(h)(1)).
122. Champion Int'l Corp. v. EPA, 648 F. Supp. 1390 (W.D.N.C. 1986), vacated, 850 F.2d
182 (4th Cir. 1988). The district court found that the EPA, in assuming permitting authority, had
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subject matter jurisdiction,II it found that the EPA's act of assuming
permitting authority was within the agency's authority and "consistent
With statute and regulation."'
2 4
In Oklahoma v. EPA12 5 the Tenth Circuit agreed with the EPA's
position that the Act required Arkansas to comply with Oklahoma's
federally approved water quality standards " but disagreed with the
EPA's issuance of the Fayetteville permit.' 2 The court reconciled its
holding regarding Arkansas' compliance with downstream water qual-
ity standards with Ouellette and the Milwaukee line of cases by point-
ing out that in these prior cases the remedies sought were always based
in nuisance, whether federal or state common law. Here, the problem
involved the application of federal statutory and regulatory law.12 The
court also relied on the EPA's statutorily mandated guidance and ulti-
mate power of approval over states in the formulation of their stan-
dards.12 9 According to the court, state water quality standards which
are approved by the EPA thus become federal law. °30 Also important
to the Tenth Circuit's reasoning was its interpretation of Section 401 of
the Act.' The court agreed with the EPA and found reasonable the
agency's interpretation that Section 401 of the Act' 312 required that Ar-
kansas comply with Oklahoma standards. 33
The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed the EPA's issuance of the
Fayetteville permit. The court found that the EPA's interpretation of
the facts at the administrative proceedings was "arbitrary and capri-
cious" for failing to consider an important aspect of the problem and
for misinterpreting and misapplying two of Oklahoma's water quality
not exceeded its delegated authority. 850 F.2d at 185-86.
123. 850 F.2d at 190.
124. Id. at 187. See Gaynor, supra note 79, at 303.
125. 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990).
126. Id. at 604, 615.
127. Id. at 616, 634.
128. Id. at 607.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
[The licensing or permitting] agency, based upon the recommendations of such
State, . . . shall condition such license or permit in such manner as may be necessary
to insure compliance with applicable water quality requirements. If the imposition of
conditions cannot insure such compliance such agency shall not issue such license or
permit.
908 F.2d at 609-10 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2)).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
133. 908 F.2d at 611.
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standards.1 3' According to the court, the fact entirely overlooked by the
EPA was that the Illinois River was already degraded prior to the addi-
tion of the Fayetteville effluent to the river system.
13 5
III. REASONING OF THE COURT IN ARKANSAS V. OKLAHOMA
In Arkansas v. Oklahoma136 the Supreme Court was faced with
the question of whether the EPA had the statutory authority under the
Act to require Arkansas to comply with the more stringent water qual-
ity standards of a downstream state."3 7 The Court held that it did.138 It
also held, however, that the EPA's factual determination-that the
Fayetteville discharge would result in no detectable violation of
Oklahoma's standards-was entitled to substantial deference,1 39
thereby overruling the Tenth Circuit and reinstating the Fayetteville
permit. 40
The Court began with an analysis of Oklahoma's water quality
standards. 1 4  It emphasized that in the administrative proceedings be-
low, the CJO relied upon Section 301(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water
Act14 1 in reaching his conclusion that the Act mandated that Arkansas
comply with the downstream water quality standards of Oklahoma.
Section 301(b)(1)(C) of the Act "requires an NPDES permit to im-
pose any effluent limitations necessary to comply with applicable stare
water quality standards."" 3 The Court succinctly restated the argu-
ments consistently advanced by both parties throughout the litigation 
1 4
as a foundation for its conclusion that the Tenth Circuit's decision was
based on the arguments of neither party." 5 Justice Stevens, writing for
134. Id. at 616, 630. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
135. 908 F.2d at 625.
136. 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
137. Id. at 1056.
138. Id. at 1057.
139. Id. at 1059-60.
140. Id. at 1060.
141. Id. at 1051 n.2. Specifically, the Court noted that Sections 3 and 5 of the Oklahoma
Water Quality Standards prohibited the degradation of the water quality of the upper Illinois
River immediately west of the Arkansas-Oklahoma border. Id.
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1988).
143. 112 S. Ct. at 1051-52 (citing Brief for Petitioners app. at 116a-17a).
144. Id. at 1052. Arkansas argued that the Act did not require it to comply with the water
quality standards of a downstream state. Oklahoma objected to the EPA's factual determination
that the Fayetteville discharge would not result in a violation of its standards. Id.
145. Id. The court of appeals accepted neither of the parties' arguments and, instead, ad-
vanced its own. The Court stated that the "novelty of the Court of Appeals' decision persuaded us
to grant certiorari." Id. (citing Ill S. Ct. 1412 (1991)).
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a unanimous Court,146 noted that the court of appeals based its decision
upon a novel and self-styled rule which required the denial of any per-
mit for a point source discharge if the discharge would " 'contribute to
conditions currently constituting a violation of applicable water quality
standards . ' "47
The Court acknowledged its past application of the common law in
cases of interstate water pollution disputes.148 Citing the foreshadowing
in Milwaukee I that a time might come when federal legislation would
preempt the field,' 9 the Court turned its focus to the important mod-
ern cases interpreting the 1972 Amendments to the FWPCA and the
Clean Water Act of 1977.150
The Court reiterated its ruling in Milwaukee H that the compre-
hensive nature of the 1972 Amendments did, in fact, preempt the fed-
eral common law in interstate water pollution cases.' 51 It also focused
on the roles played by the states and by the EPA in the statutory per-
mitting scheme. The Court noted that the Act affords a downstream
state an opportunity to participate in a source state's permit hearing by
requiring the source state to consider recommendations submitted by
the affected state. The Court also pointed out the EPA's oversight
power to veto a source state's permit. The Administrator may veto the
issuance of a permit if the source state either refuses to comply with a
downstream state's water quality standards or fails to sufficiently ex-
plain to the affected state and the Administrator the reasons for its
146. 112 S.Ct. at 1050.
147. Id. at 1052. (citing Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 620 (10th Cir. 1990)). The
Tenth Circuit found that the Illinois River was "already degraded" and that the effluent from the
Fayetteville plant could be expected to reach the Oklahoma border and contribute to the further
degradation of the river even though the effect of the effluent in Oklahoma would not be detecta-
ble. Id.
"[Tihe Court of Appeals candidly acknowledged that its theory 'has apparently never before
been addressed by a federal court.' " Id. at 1058 (citing Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 620
n.39 (10th Cir. 1990)). The Court stated that "[t]o the extent that the Court of Appeals relied on
its interpretation of the Act to reverse the EPA's permitting decision, that reliance was mis-
placed." Id. at 1058.
148. Id. at 1052-53. The Court maintained that in these cases its use of the common law
had always been "tempered by a respect for the sovereignty of the States." Id. at 1053.
149. Id. at 1053. In Milwaukee 1, the Court stated, "It may happen that new federal laws
and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance."
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
150. 112 S. Ct. at 1053-54. The cases which were the subject of the Court's analysis were
Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), Milwaukee I11, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), and Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987). 112 S. Ct. at 1053-54.
151. 112 S. Ct. at 1053.
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failure to adopt the recommendations of the affected state in the issu-
ance of its permit. 5 * The Court noted that Milwaukee H left open the
question of the availability of Illinois' common law as a remedy in an
interstate pollution dispute. 68 The Court added that the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Milwaukee III, in addressing that question, held that Section
510 of the Act did no more than to preserve the right of a source state
to regulate dischargers within its own boundaries. 5
The Court affirmed the principles set forth by the Seventh Circuit
in Milwaukee III in its analysis of Ouellette.155 According to the
Court, Ouellette stands for the proposition that the "only state law ap-
plicable to an interstate discharge is 'the law of the State in which the
point source is located.' '"'0 Justice Stevens related that the Court in
Ouellette again emphasized the roles of the states and the EPA in the
permitting process. Under Section 402 of the Act, a downstream state
does not have the authority to block the issuance of a source state's
permit.157 The only avenue of appeal for an affected state is to the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA, who then has the statutory authority"'8 to veto
the permit if the source state declines to comply with the water quality
standards of the downstream state.1 59 Citing Ouellette, Stevens pointed
out that the permitting process clearly provides that an affected state
occupies a subordinate position.160 Concluding its historical analysis,
the Court distinguished the present case from its previous line of cases
by emphasizing that the present case involves a permit authorized by
federal statute and issued by a federal administrative agency, rather
than a permit issued by a state.'
The Court, drawing from its analysis of the statutory scheme in
152. Id. The Court stated that "[wie observed that Congress had addressed many of the
problems we had identified in Milwaukee I by providing a downstream State" with these proce-
dural safeguards. Id.
153. Id. While the holding in Milwaukee 1I could clearly be construed to mean that the
Clean Water Act supplanted the federal common law as a remedy in interstate water pollution
disputes, the question regarding the availability of state common law as a remedy to states
remained.
154. Id. This ruling suggested that an affected state could not, therefore, impose its laws on
an out-of-state discharger.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987)).
157. 112 S.Ct. at 1053-54.
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1988).





Milwaukee H, Milwaukee III, and Ouellette, emphasized the shared
responsibilities of the states and the federal government in achieving
the main objective of the Act 162 and the roles of each in the permitting
system.' as The Court stated that the Act establishes two types of water
quality measures: (1) "Effluent limitations,"""a which are promulgated
by the EPA, and (2) "Water quality standards,"'6 5 which are generally
"promulgated by the States and establish the desired condition of a
waterway." ' 6
The Court stressed the EPA's oversight in the statutory scheme.
"The EPA provides States with substantial guidance in the drafting of
water quality standards.' 67 Section 303 of the Act18 requires states to
review the standards periodically and to seek approval from the EPA if
there are any revisions of the standards. In addition, if the EPA recom-
mends changes with which the state refuses to comply, the EPA has
the authority under the statute "to promulgate water quality standards
for the State."' 69
Throughout its analysis of the statutory scheme, the Court empha-
sized sections of the Act that give the Administrator oversight over
state permitting programs. 17 0 The Court found such an example in the
structure of the NPDES system.17 1 It noted that while the procedural
provisions in Sections 402(b)(3) and (5) of the Act 172 were designed to
162. Id. The main objective of the Act is "[t]o restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
163. 112 S. Ct. at 1054.
164. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314 (1988).
165. Id. § 1313 (1988).
166. 112 S. Ct. at 1054.
167. Id. The EPA provides states with model water quality standards. See generally 40
C.F.R. § 131 (1991).
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1988).
169. 112 S. Ct. at 1054.
170. Id. at 1054-55.
171. Section 402(b) of the Act provides for two types of permitting systems. One adminis-
tered by the states, subject to EPA requirements and approval, and another system administered
by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). If a state has its own permitting authority, the EPA's role in
the scheme is to oversee and ensure compliance of the source state in its licensing of a discharge
permit. Id.
172. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) requires the source state to notify any affected state and pro-
vide the opportunity for a public hearing. Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) requires that the source state allow any affected state to submit rec-
ommendations regarding effluent limitations which may affect its water quality for consideration
by the source state. If these recommendations are not followed, § 1342(b)(5) mandates that the
source state report to the affected state and the Administrator the reasons as to why these recom-
mendations are not incorporated in its permit. Id.
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protect affected states, they do not allow an affected state to block the
issuance of the source state's permit. 173 Section 402(d)(2) of the Act"
4
gives that authority to the Administrator." Also, in the absence of a
federally approved permitting authority, Section 402(a) of the Act 176
gives the EPA the authority to issue a permit for a state. 7 The EPA
has interpreted the Act as requiring any EPA-issued permit to comply
with the same requirements set forth under the Act for state-issued
permits.17 8 Thus, Section 401(a)(2)" 9 also applies to EPA-issued per-
mits. That section "appears to prohibit the issuance of any federal li-
cense or permit over the objection of an affected State unless compli-
ance with the affected State's water quality requirements can be
insured." 80
Following its statutory analysis, the Court addressed the issues
presented. Justice Stevens posed three questions, two of which the
Court immediately answered.' 8 ' First, does the Act require that the
EPA, in issuing a permit, mandate that a source state comply with the
water quality standards of a downstream state? 82 The Court stated
that it was not necessary to answer this question since this case in-
volved a permit issued by the federal government and not by a state.'83
The EPA's assumption that it must require Fayetteville to comply with
Oklahoma standards was both permissible and reasonable under the
Act.""' Second, if the Act does not require the EPA to mandate com-
pliance with downstream standards, does the EPA have the statutory
authority to force compliance? 8 5 To this question, the Court answered
173. 112 S. Ct. at 1055.
174. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1988). The EPA relied on this section in Champion Int'l. See
supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
175. 112 S. Ct. at 1055.
176. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1988). The EPA issued Arkansas' permit in this case because
Arkansas had no permitting authority.
177. 112 S. Ct. at 1055.
178. Id. Although this statement would appear to be self-evident, the Court raised this point
because Arkansas' permit was issued by the Agency itself, rather than by Arkansas. The Act as
interpreted by the EPA, according to the Court, imposes the same regulations on the Agency itself
when it issues a permit as it does on a state when a state licenses a discharge.
179. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) (1988).
180. 112 S. Ct. at 1055.







yes. 186 It listed among its reasons federal regulations 18 7 which state that
a permit will not be issued when a source state's discharge cannot com-
ply with the applicable water quality standards of affected states. 188
The message the Court conveyed is that Congress, under Section
402 of the Act, has entrusted the Administrator with broad discretion
in issuing or refusing to issue permits. 189 The Court used as an example
Section 402(d)(2), 90 which gives the Administrator the authority to
veto the issuance of a state's permit.' 9' The Court opined that the
Agency's interpretation of the Act-that the Act requires Arkansas'
compliance with Oklahoma's standards-was a reasonable exercise of
the Agency's statutory discretion.
192
Before addressing the third question, the Court turned to Arkan-
sas' argument that inconsistencies exist between the holding in this case
and Ouellette. 93 Arkansas argued that allowing the EPA to mandate
compliance with Oklahoma standards would be contradictory to the
Court's holding in Ouellette."" That case held that the only law appli-
cable in an interstate water pollution dispute was that of the source
state. 95 To that argument, the Court answered that "[1]imits on an
affected State's direct participation in permitting decisions . . . do not
in any way constrain the EPA's authority to require a point source to
comply with downstream water quality standards."' 96 For the above
reasons, the Court found the EPA's ruling requiring that Arkansas
"comply with Oklahoma's water quality standards to be a reasonable
exercise of the Agency's substantial statutory discretion."' 97
The third question posed by Justice Stevens, echoing the holding
186. Id.
187. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.4(d), 122.44(d) (1991).
188. 112 S. Ct. at 1056.
189. Id.
190. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1988).
191. 112 S. Ct. at 1056.
192. Id. at 1056-57.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1057.
195. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 487 (1987).
196. 112 S. Ct. at 1057.
197. Id. The Court cited as authority Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). Chevron held that where "there is an express delega-
tion of authority to the agency . . . [s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 467 U.S. at 843-44.
The Court added that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's con-




of the court of appeals, is whether the Act provides that "once a body
of water fails to meet water quality standards no discharge that yields
effluent that reach the degraded waters will be permitted."10" The
Court disagreed with the Tenth Circuit and held that the Act supports
no such reading.1"
The Court expressed concern that the Tenth Circuit decided the
third question presented based on an argument advanced by neither
party. 00 The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' deci-
sion that the EPA's issuance of the Fayetteville permit was "arbitrary
and capricious" for allegedly misinterpreting Oklahoma's water quality
standards.2 0 ' The Court noted that Oklahoma had not advanced this
argument. 2 Therefore, the "Court of Appeals exceeded the legitimate
scope of judicial review of an agency adjudication. 20 8
The Court reasoned that EPA regulations0 4 require a source state
to comply with the water quality standards of all affected states,
thereby incorporating into federal law all state standards the Agency
deems applicable.2 0 5 The Court, in support of this contention, main-
tained that courts have long held that interstate water pollution is gov-
erned by federal law. 20 6 Also, treating federally approved state stan-
dards as federal law allows the EPA to ensure the uniformity of the
system. 07 The Court stated that the EPA's interpretation of those fed-
eral regulations are "entitled to substantial deference" because
Oklahoma's standards take on a "federal character." 20 8
The Court noted other deficiencies in the Tenth Circuit's decision.
First, the court of appeals failed to give due deference to the EPA in
the interpretation of its own regulations-Oklahoma's federally ap-
proved water quality standards.2 0 ' The Tenth Circuit should have af-
forded the Administrative Law Judge and Chief Judicial Officer appro-
priate deference in their conclusions that those standards would not be
198. 112 S. Ct. at 1056.
199. Id. at 1057.




204. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (1991).
205. 112 S. Ct. at 1058-59.
206. Id. at 1059.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865).
209. 112 S. Ct. at 1059-60.
1992]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
violated.21 0 Second, the court of appeals ignored "well-established stan-
dards for reviewing the factual findings of agencies and instead made
its own factual findings. ' 211 A court, according to Justice Stevens, in its
capacity of judicial review, should uphold the factual finding of an ad-
ministrative agency as long as there is "substantial evidence" in the
record to support the agency's finding.2 12 A court should not overrule
an agency finding by concluding that there is evidence to support some
alternative finding.213
Finally, the Tenth Circuit was mistaken in concluding that the
EPA's issuance of the permit was "arbitrary and capricious" for failing
"to consider an important aspect of the problem, ' 214 the degraded sta-
tus of the Illinois River. This aspect was "important" only because of
the Tenth Circuit's first two errors interpreting controlling law. 2 5 The
Court concluded that the court of appeals made a policy decision that
it was not authorized to make "for it is clear that Congress has en-
trusted such decisions to the Environmental Protection Agency."-1
IV. ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Oklahoma declined to answer
the question of whether the Clean Water Act requires a source state to
comply with the water quality standards of a downstream state. The
Court only held that the EPA may reasonably exercise its statutory
discretion to mandate such compliance. 21" The Court, therefore, left
open for further speculation the consequences of a source state, through
its own EPA-approved NPDES permitting program, issuing a permit
which disregards either the recommendations concerning effluent limi-
tations offered by a downstream state218 or the water quality standards
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1060.
212. Id. (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)).
213. 112 S.Ct. at 1060.
214. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)).
215. 112 S.Ct. at 1060.
216. Id. at 1061.
217. Id. at 1056.
218. Section 402 of the Act requires a source state to allow a downstream state the opportu-
nity to participate in a public hearing prior to the issuance of a permit by allowing the affected
state to offer recommendations in writing, both to the source state, as well as the Administrator of
the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). These recommendations might, for example, suggest ways in
which a source state could alter its discharge permit in order to avoid causing an adverse effect on
the waters of the downstream state.
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of the affected state. The Court strongly hinted that the outcome in
such a case would be the same as that in Champion International v.
EPA.21" In an impasse involving an upstream state having its own pro-
gram and refusing to comply with the applicable standards of a down-
stream state, the EPA, as in Champion, would most likely invoke Sec-
tion 402(d)(2) of the Act22 to supplant the source state's jurisdiction
by vetoing the permit.
In ruling that EPA-approved, state-promulgated water quality
standards take on a "federal character, ' 2 1 the Court has solidified the
EPA's position as the ultimate interpreter of federally-approved, state
water quality standards. The opinion suggests not only that the EPA
has the final say on the interpretation of applicable state water quality
standards, but also that the Agency has the final authority, as fact-
finder, to decide whether a discharge will cause an actual, detectable
violation of applicable water quality standards. If the Agency finds
such an effect, it has the discretion to mandate upstream compliance
with downstream requirements.
A more intriguing question left unanswered by the Supreme Court
is whether Section 510 of the Act, 222 which allows a state to promul-
gate pollution control standards more stringent than those required by
the EPA, also requires a permitting state's point source discharger to
comply with the stricter water quality standards of a downstream
state.2 23 The Court dismissed Arkansas' argument that more stringent
standards cannot be applied to out-of-state dischargers by pointing out
"that section only concerns state authority and does not constrain the
EPA's authority to promulgate reasonable regulations" in downstream
states.224
The Court's reasoning on this point also suggests its unwillingness
to directly confront the specific issue. May Oklahoma designate por-
tions of all of its rivers that are near the Arkansas border and originate
in Arkansas as "scenic rivers" and then promulgate stringent "no new
discharge" anti-degradation water quality standards for each? Would
the EPA approve these as reasonable standards? State agency person-
nel in at least one upstream state fear that the EPA merely rubber-
219. 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
220. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1988).
221. 112 S. Ct. at 1059.
222. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).




stamps state-promulgated water quality standards which are at least as
stringent as required by the Act.2 28 Those standards which are more
stringent than required by federal law may make for interesting inter-
state water pollution disputes in the future. It is significant to note that
while the Clean Water Act provides for an affected state's participation
in the permitting decision of an upstream state, there is no reciprocal
opportunity for an upstream state to participate in the promulgation of
water quality standards of a downstream state.
EPA personnel, however, maintain that the more stringent state-
promulgated regulatory requirements allowed under Section 510 of the
Act,226 even if approved by EPA, will not automatically apply across
state lines.227 The EPA may be able to approve these more stringent
standards with some disclaimer stating that the more stringent aspects,
such as a "no new discharge" provision, will not be applicable to an
upstream state.
2 28
Other experts also foresee little impact on the method used by
states or the EPA to issue permits. 2 9 To date, thirty-nine states have
their own EPA-approved NPDES permitting authority, and most
states, according to the EPA, already take downstream states into ac-
count in their permitting processes."' The director of one major envi-
ronmental organization sees little change because he believes that the
Court's reasoning underlying the ruling on Arkansas' EPA-issued per-
mit will also apply to states which run their own permitting
programs.
231
In summary, this decision stands for the proposition that, in the
context of the NPDES permitting system, the EPA has the statutory
authority to mandate upstream compliance with downstream standards,
so long as those standards are seen by the EPA as reasonable. The
EPA also has the authority to oversee the setting of state water quality
standards and the discretion to interpret those standards, thereby trans-
forming them into federal law. Once the standards are considered fed-
eral law, the EPA becomes the ultimate interpreter of those standards
225. Telephone Interview with Arkansas state agency personnel who spoke on condition of
anonymity (June 19, 1992).
226. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
227. Telephone Interview with Pat Rankin, Attorney, EPA, Region VI (June 22, 1992).
228. Id.
229. 22 Env't. Rep. 2464 (BNA) (Mar. 6 1992).
230. Id.
231. Id. (conveying opinion of Mark Van Putten, Director of the National Wildlife Federa-
tion's Great Lakes Natural Resources Center).
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and the final fact-finder in enforcement actions. In the regulatory
scheme, courts no longer will apply the federal or state common laws of
nuisance. The only remedy for downstream states will come from the
EPA and the Act itself.
As long as EPA personnel act reasonably in interpreting down-
stream state regulations, the water quality standards of affected states
will be protected. At the same time, the rights of upstream states to
issue permits which are beneficial to the interests of their citizens will
also be maintained. These source state interests should be balanced
against environmental interests and the potential harm to the affected
waters of downstream states. The purpose of the Clean Water Act is,
after all, to maintain and protect the integrity of the nation's waters.,"
While in this action the City of Fayetteville won its permit fight,
the result of the decision is that Arkansas and other upstream states
must now be acutely aware of the water quality standards of down-
stream states. The next Arkansas border-town which applies for a per-
mit to discharge effluents into an interstate stream may not be so lucky.
This decision makes it perfectly clear that the Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the Clean Water Act to give to the EPA the ultimate author-
ity over states in the NPDES permitting system. The decision also un-
dermines severely many of the legal and academic arguments advanced
by commentators which contend that Congress did not intend for the
Clean Water Act to be the only remedy available to downstream states
in an interstate water pollution dispute. 38
According to the Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 3' af-
fected states now must rely solely upon the EPA and the Clean Water
Act for relief from alleged harms caused by upstream dischargers.
Whether environmentalists and the EPA will concur on the meaning of
state-promulgated water quality standards and the interpretation of the
technical fact situations of future cases as to what will constitute an
"actual, detectable" affect on a state's water quality remains to be
seen. The respect and deference accorded by states and environmental-
232. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
233. The commentators in most of the secondary materials used in the preparation of this
note argue that the procedural safeguards contained in the Clean Water Act provide inadequate
remedies to affected states. Prior to this case, the commentators generally agreed upon the need to
preserve either state or federal common law as a remedy for downstream states in interstate water
pollution disputes or in the alternative, the creation of new statutory relief. See generally,
Glicksman, supra note 70; Bushong, supra note 78; Gaynor, supra note 79; Maurrasse, supra note
11; and Whitesell, supra note 79.
234. 112 S. Ct. at 1046 (1992).
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ists to the EPA in interstate water pollution disputes may well deter-
mine whether Congress will choose to revisit this area of law.
2
35
Thomas E. Osment, Jr.
235. As of the writing of this casenote, Senator David Boren of Oklahoma, has introduced a
bill, S. 2971, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), to amend the national Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,
Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-86 (1988)),
which would afford protection to the Illinois River pending a decision by the Secretary of the
Interior whether to add the river to the list of the nation's federally protected "wild and scenic
rivers." The implication of this legislation in the context of the dispute between Arkansas and
Oklahoma over the Illinois River is, as yet, unclear.
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